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Mr. and Mrs. Goebel submit this Reply Brief and Brief in Response to the
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant.
The Goebels stand by their legal analysis, and its application to the instant
dispute, that is set forth in their Opening Brief.l They seek to refrain from
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which they remain
confident, that appear in that Brief.
I.

SOUTHERN HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED, BECAUSE
IT CANNOT, THE GOEBELS5 CONTENTION THAT THEY ARE
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT, THE
GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL, AND THE OTHER RELIEF THEY
REQUEST.
A.

SOUTHERN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINS
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS AND POTENTIALLY MISLEADING
STATEMENTS.

The Goebels reply, as follows, to parts of Southern's Statement of Facts that
may fairly, so that the Court may have an accurate picture, require reply.

The Goebels5 counsel has noted certain errors that appear in the Goebels5 Opening
Brief. First, the word "ambiguous,55 appearing in the first line of p. 5, was intended to
be, and should be read as, "unambiguous.55 Also, the case of Lindsay v. Gibbons and
Reed, 497 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972), discussed at p. 29, was there miscited. Also, the
word "reversible55 appearing in the middle of p. 39, should be read, to make more
sense, as "prejudicial.55 Finally, as noted by the City at the first, unnumbered page and
page 2 of its Brief, the pertinent sections of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do,
indeed, relate to Issue No. 6 addressed in the Goebels5 Opening Brief, rather than Issue
No. 3.
The Goebels' counsel apologizes to the Court and opposing counsel for any
confusion or unnecessary effort that these errors, or any of them, may have caused.
1

1.

First, it is not literally correct to say, as Southern has at p. 6 said, that

"Mr. Goebel has no recollection of what actually caused his accident." He has a
recollection of avoiding the protuberance (e.g., R. 6765, Tr. 674; R. 6767, Tr. 1139),
by moving to the left, with that movement bringing him into line with the subject gap
and without which movement there is no reason to think the incident would have
occurred.
2.

The Goebels dispute the characterization, at p. 7, that the Administration

and Coordination Agreement "demonstrated UTA's control over its railroad." There
was no evidence presented at trial that UTA did anything, for purposes pertinent to this
dispute, to "control" the railroad. The question has to do, in any event, with
Southern's responsibilities with respect to the subject crossing and its immediate
environs. And Southern owed the Goebels duties of care, as the District Court found
(R. 6761, Tr. 4), pursuant to the Freight Easement (Ex. P-45; copy included in the
Addendum hereto at 001-018), the Utah statutes, and the Salt Lake City ordinance.
3.

Southern's suggestion, at p. 7, that it had no right or obligation to do

things not directly related to freight rail service is myopic and ignores other parts (e.g.,
section 3.3) of the Agreement (appended to the Goebels' Opening Brief at 043-76).
Southern also fails to reckon with the fact that its own John Martinez (R. 6065-68;
6171) in fact performed maintenance activities on other crossings along the line that is
covered by the Agreement. Mr. Martinez testified that he was "responsible for

2

anything along that railroad track." R. 6065-68; 6185. He was, according to
Southern's strained analysis, a trespasser when he was doing that work, and there was
nothing surreptitious about what he was doing. Apart from duties under the Agreement (and apart from duties under the pertinent statutes and ordinance), Southern
assumed, as a matter of easement law, the duty to provide a reasonably safe surface
for Mr. Goebel and other bicyclists who traveled over the crossings along the line.
4.

Southern gives Kathy Goebel too much credit when it says, at p. 10, that

she "formulated a theory that on the date of the accident one particular space between
two of the gauge panels was of such a precise width and depth that it barely
accommodated the front tire of the bicycle." Mrs. Goebel's analysis was considerably
less profound. That gap simply caught her eye and presented itself as the likely

2

Because Southern has not challenged the District Court's ruling that Southern owed
the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to the Easement, Southern should not now be able
to argue a lack of duty on that basis. The Goebels address this easement question for
the Court's consideration if the Court decides, nonetheless, to examine it. In Salt Lake
City Southern Railroad Company v. State Tax Commission, 987 P.2d 594 (Utah
1999), this Court upheld a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission that the very
Easement that is involved in this litigation is tangible property subject to taxation. The
Goebels acknowledge that that dispute did not involve tort issues, but point out that the
Court construed the Easement as something that
gave [Southern] the exclusive right to make use of the land and trackage for
freight railroad operations. Although the Easement, in the abstract, was nonphysical, it gave the company the right to use and occupy the physical property
involved.
Id. at 598 (emphasis added). Easement holders owe the public the duty of reasonable
care. E.g., McDermott v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 607 N.E.2d 1271, 1285 (111.
App. 1992); Levy v. Kimball 443 P.2d 142, 148 (Haw. 1968).
3

culprit. R. 6767, Tr. 1141. None of her initial impressions as to precisely what
occurred, and none of the Goebels5 counsel's initial impressions, are of any particular
significance. What is of particular significance is the analysis of David Ingebretsen,
the Goebels' accident reconstruction and causation expert. The Goebels commend the
entirety of his testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 752 to R. 6766, Tr. 982; R. 6767, Tr. 1100-06)
to the Court's thorough consideration. Mr. Ingebretsen's accident causation analysis
was buttressed by the testimony of Dave Roberts, the eyewitness, whom the Goebels
did not discover until years after the incident occurred. The Goebels likewise
commend to the Court's thorough consideration the entirety of the testimony of
Mr. Roberts (R. 6762, Tr. 132-65).
5.

The fact that Southern's accident reconstruction expert offered an

opinion on accident causation that differs from Mr. Ingebretsen's opinion is of no
outcome-determinative significance. Mr. Ingebretsen gave testimony (e.g., R. 6766,
Tr. 851-64; 874; 977-80) that convincingly ruled out any alternative scenarios,
including the non-credible and speculative ones pushed by Southern.
6.

It is misleading for Southern to state, as it does at pp. 11 and 12, that

"the only precise measurements taken of the gap between panels 1 and 8 while the
crossing was still in place demonstrated that it was not wide enough to accommodate
Mr. Goebel's rim let alone the tires." Jeff Ertel, the Goebels' investigator, on
March 22, 1998 measured that gap as being % of an inch wide (R. 6762, Tr. 179-80;

4

Ex. P-13). The fact that Mr. Ertel used a tape measure rather than the measuring
instrument used by David Stephens does not render Mr. Ertel's measurements
"imprecise." Three quarters of an inch was wide enough for the wheel to be driven
into the gap (R. 6765, Tr. 805-06). All witnesses who were asked the question
acknowledged that material, including the rubber pads at the crossing, contracts in cold
weather and expands in hot weather (e.g., R.6765, Tr. 801-04; R. 6762, Tr. 116; R.
6065-70; 6087; 6207-08). As the rubber pads expand, the gaps between them will, of
course, become less wide. The incident happened in wintertime, on February 19th.
Mr. Stephens made his measurements at the end of July (R. 6767, Tr. 1175, 1185), the
hottest time of the year. An example of the difference in size between March (when
•I

Mr. Ertel made his measurements) and the July measurements made by Mr. Stephens
can be seen by comparing Ex. P-13 (Mr. Ertel's measurements - see, particularly, the
15/16 inch measurement he made of the gap that Mrs. Goebel thought was the one)
with the .774 measurement of that gap made by Mr. Stephens in July. R. 6767, Tr.
1186.
7.

Another misleading thing in Southern's Brief is its reference, at p. 12, to

the July debris-filled gap. See Ex. P-8 (smaller copy included in the Addendum
hereto, at 019), the lower left corner of which shows the condition of the gap in

3

It was warmer on March 22n , the date of the measurements, than it was on the date of
the incident. See Ex. P-50 and P-51.
5

question at the time, two or three days after the incident, that that photo was taken.
Mrs. Goebel did not dig any debris out; and there was no debris in the gap near the
surface of the crossing. R. 6767, Tr. 1152-53. See, also, the Ertel videotape (Ex. P12), made March 14, 1998 (a CD ROM copy of that videotape is included in the
Addendum hereto, at 020).
8.

There is no support for the suggestion, in footnote 1 (p. 12), that

Mr. Goebel hit the protuberance. That is, like Southern's suggestion that Mr. Goebel
hit a phantom object sitting on the tracks, utter speculation and unsupported by the
evidence. It is directly at odds with the testimony of Mr. Goebel (R. 6765, Tr. 674),
and it is (given the location of the protuberance) at odds with the testimony of
eyewitness Dave Roberts (R. 6762, Tr. 149). And Southern's theory of Mr. Goebel's
having gone off the roadway and hitting an exposed rail was shown to be not worthy
of belief. See the testimony of Mr. Goebel (R. 6765, Tr. 662-63; 702), Mr. Roberts (R.
6762, Tr. 165), Jeffrey Clark, a paramedic (R. 6763, Tr. 227), Mr. Ingebretsen (R.
6766, Tr. 852-57; 978-80), and, when understood, Dr. Woolley (Southern's expert)
himself (R. 6767, Tr. 1083-91).
9.

Southern goes to considerable length, at pp. 13-22, in its attempt to

convince the Court that, because no one had pre-accident actual knowledge of the
specific gap involved in the incident, and because people did not identify that specific
gap as the one involved in the incident until years after the incident (when

6

Mr. Ingebretsen's accident reconstruction work was being done), Southern should not
be held to have had constructive notice. That analysis may have superficial appeal, but
its validity disappears under careful scrutiny. First, and with respect to Mr. Martinez
and Mr. Perry, the record is abundantly clear that neither of those men ever concerned
himself with the safety of bicyclists or with gaps of this nature. E.g., R.6065-68; 6167;
6194; R. 6767, Tr. 1168-70. If someone does not concern himself with a particular
thing, how can he be expected to take note of that thing? Next, the fact that Mr. Alires
did not notice such a gap is of no particular probative significance. There is no
indication of when he had last been anywhere near the scene prior to the time of the
incident or that he was looking for this kind of hazard. The same applies to
Mr. Aguilar and to Mr. Mecham, who, as noted by Southern, never had gaps at
crossings as a problem for bicyclists even cross his mind. Mr. Mumford's report that
the subject crossing was in "good condition" in 1993, when his report was likely done
(R. 6765, Tr. 612), is of no probative value. It is too remote in time, and there is no
indication that he was thinking of gaps in crossings that might jeopardize the safety of
bicycle riders.
Nor is there any indication that Jeffrey Clark, the paramedic, or Daniel
Miller, the Union Pacific man, ever actually looked for gaps in the subject crossing. It
may be of interest that, as pointed out by Southern, Mr. Miller did not (even after
hearing about the incident) think there was anything potentially dangerous even about

7

the gap in which at least two of Mrs. Goebel's fingers are placed, a gap which
measured 15/16" a few weeks later, a gap by all accounts wide enough to
accommodate Mr. Goebel's bicycle tire and to cause a catastrophic injury to occur.
Mr. Miller's approach to bicycle safety may be an example of the rule, set forth in
MUJI 3.10, to the effect that even an entire industry may be negligent. It is also unfair
for Southern to ask the Court to accord any importance to Ex. D-l, inasmuch as that
photograph was, as explained hereinabove, taken in the middle of the summer when
the subject gap had, according to the essence of all testimony on this subject, narrowed
from the time of the incident.
Southern's Mr. Jackson went to the scene in hot weather. It is not
surprising that he could find no gap which would have posed a hazard to a bicyclist. It
is also of interest that the testimony of Mr. Jackson, like that of his company's
employee, Mr. Martinez, supports the proposition that Southern did not actively
concern itself with the safety of bicyclists or with gaps that could endanger bicyclists.
E.g., R. 6765, Tr. 620-22.
When Mr. Ertel, the Goebels' investigator, went to the scene, he, like
Mrs. Goebel, and like the Goebels' counsel prior to the time the accident
reconstruction was done, focused on the larger gap. That simply appeared to be the
likeliest candidate before Mr. Ingebretsen's analysis was done. Also, Mr. Ertel
testified (R. 6762, Tr. 180-81) that he was of the impression that that gap, like the

8

larger gap, did not have much debris in it and appeared to be wide enough to
accommodate a bicycle wheel.4
The Goebels, through their counsel mindful of alternative MUJI
instruction 8.8 (quoted at p. 24 of the Goebels' Opening Brief), called Chuck Collins
for the purpose, among others, of explaining that 1700 South is a commonly used
bicycle route. The fact that he did not notice any gap at the crossing that he thought
might be a hazard to bicyclists is overplayed by Southern. First, there is no evidence
as to the last time prior to the incident that Mr. Collins rode over that crossing. It is
also significant that Mr. Collins explained that, while riding a bicycle at 20 m.p.h. (the
top end of Mr. Goebel's approximate speed), he would typically be looking 30-40 feet
ahead (R. 6763, Tr. 377). There is no evidence that he or Mr. Goebel or any other
bicyclist stopped at the crossing to inspect it for gaps. They, unlike Southern, had no
duty to inspect. At the speed at which Mr. Goebel (and, presumably, Mr. Collins) rode
(15-20 mph or 22-30 feet per second; R. 6766, Tr. 825-26), a bicyclist traverses the
crossing very quickly and, given other things (vehicular traffic and other crossing
hazards) with which bicyclists must deal, and the lack of color contrast between the

4

In reply to footnote 2 of Southern's Brief, the Goebels note that they certainly did not
intend to distort anything with respect to the "freeze frame" or "videograb." Ex. P-10
came into evidence without objection. The Court is, in any event, encouraged to
review the actual videotape, which also clearly shows the subject gap. Perhaps more
importantly, Southern's continuing to stress its Ex. D-l, an enlargement of a photo
taken in July, is an example of the weakness of Southern's position in this Appeal.
9

black rubber pads and the gap, it is not surprising that Mr. Collins did not notice
whatever gaps, relatively small but large enough to swallow a bicycle tire, may have
existed during his own trips across the crossing. Also, Mr. Collins explained (R. 6763,
Tr. 362) that, once he generally acquainted himself with the crossing, he did not pay
particular heed to what was happening with gaps. He simply stayed away from the
seams between the pads.
Southern attempts to make much of the fact that no one who testified in
this case had ever heard of an incident, other than the subject incident, in which a bike
rider's wheel had gone into a gap between crossing pads. The fact that a particular
kind of incident had not, within the knowledge of testifying witnesses, happened
before, is not of outcome-determinative significance. At least two witnesses who
testified (R. 6065-68; 6198-99; 6211) acknowledged the adage that there is a first time
for everything. Also, it may be of interest that Mr. Collins testified regarding
analogous hazards (drainage grates - of the kind that appears in the gutter near the
beginning of the Ertel videotape - and gaps between cattle crossing guards on
highways). R. 6763, Tr. 355-56. See, also, the discussion at 35, below.
Southern misses the mark in its heavy reliance on Mr. Goebel's not
noticing the gap before the incident occurred.5 First, like Mr. Collins, he had no

5

If Mr. Goebel had had knowledge of the dangerous subject gap, Southern would
almost certainly be arguing that the Goebels are barred from recovering by reason of
10

responsibility to inspect the crossing for safety. Like Mr. Collins, he rode looking
ahead 30-40 feet. R. 6765, Tr. 674. His observation experience while riding, like that
of Mr. Collins, was affected by other things he had to deal with in the riding
environment and also the lack of contrast between the black pads and the gaps. Some
parts of the videotape taken by Mr. Ertel and of a photo (Ex. P-14; smaller copy
included in the Addendum hereto, at 021) Mr. Ertel took on March 22, 1998 are
illustrative of that lack of contrast. The gaps that Mr. Goebel never noticed include the
large gap in the photograph in which Mrs. Goebel's fingers appear (Ex. P-l 1,
appearing under Tab 10 in the Addendum to Southern's Brief). As with the subject
gap, there is no reason to think that that gap, which was photographed within a few
days (R. 6767, Tr. 1139-40; 1151-52) of the incident, progressed to dangerous size,
after the pads had been in place for more than four years, only in such a short interim.

the "open and obvious danger" rule, most recently discussed in Hale v. Beckstead,
2003 UT App. 240.
Also, the Court may find instructive the following discussion from Keitel v. St.
Louis C & W R. Co.. 28 Mo. App. 657, 664 (Mo. App. 1888):
The law does not, in general, drive a party to the doing of an impossible thing.
This defect was not a defect so visible and apparent to ordinary travelers on the
street as to become the subject of observation. It was rather in the nature of a
latent or obscure defect, which would, in general, not be discovered, except by
such an inspection as it was incumbent upon the defendant to make and to
maintain. From the nature of the case, it would, therefore, be in most cases
impossible for a traveler, injured as the plaintiff was, to prove at what time the
defendant became aware of the defect, or at what time the defect itself
commenced.
(Emphasis added.)
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The Court may also wish to take note of other gaps that appear in the Ertel videotape
and in Ex. P-8.
Southern misstates the District Court's reasoning when it states, in the
last sentence of its "Statement of Facts," appearing at the top of page 22: "It was this
total lack of any notice of a potential hazard or even proof that a hazard existed that
persuaded the trial court to grant a directed verdict." (Emphasis added.) The District
Court explained, as is set forth in footnote 11 (p. 41) of the Goebels' Opening Brief,
that "the gap was the proximate cause of the accident." At least to the District Court's
satisfaction, Mr. Ingebretsen's opinion of accident causation was the one that made
sense and the District Court appears indeed to have been persuaded that "a hazard
existed."
B.

PROOF OF ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IS NOT
REQUIRED WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE GOEBELS9
CLAIMS OTHER THAN THEIR NON-"PERMANENT
CONDITION" COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, AND
THEY PRESENTED SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE EVEN ON
THAT CLAIM.

The Goebels reply to Southern's contentions in the order in which those
contentions are set forth in Southern's Brief.6

6

The Goebels concur with Southern that the appropriate way to analyze Mrs. Goebel's
loss of consortium claim is that it will sink or swim with Mr. Goebel's claims on the
various issues to be decided by the Court.
12

1.

THE PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM

Notice was not even mentioned in Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah
App. 1994), or, with two exceptions, in any other public nuisance cases that have come
to the attention of the Goebels' counsel. In both of those cases it was held that the
plaintiff need not prove notice. One of those cases is Keitel v. St. Louis C. & W. R.
Co., 28 Mo. App. 657, 663 (Mo. App. 1888). The other one is Wabash R. Co. v.
DeHart 65 N.E. 192, 194-95 (Ind. App. 1902), a case that the Goebels especially
commend to the Court's consideration. That "gradual decay" case discusses many
concepts involved in this appeal, including negligence "in the nature of a public
nuisance," the importance of a railroad company's "high degree of active vigilance,"
the lack of a notice requirement, the public policy behind that rule of law, a railroad's
neglect of its duty, and prima facie showing of negligence by violation of a safety
statute.
As acknowledged by Southern, R. 860, common law negligence is something
different from non-strict liability public nuisance "negligence." Public nuisance law
appears to deal with degrees of unreasonable conduct. An entity responsible for the
safety of the public can, by its acts or omissions, be "negligent" even if its
"unreasonableness" is not so severe that it can be said to have acted "intentionally" or
"recklessly" or to have created something "ultra-hazardous." The essence of
"negligence," for public nuisance purposes, appears to be the same as it is in typical
13
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non-premises liability negligence cases. See the "negligence" instruction agreed to by
the parties. R. 5900. See, also, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-803, and the "public
nuisance" instruction agreed to by the parties. R. 5904. See, also, the instruction (R.
5941) submitted by the Goebels regarding Southern's "railroad" duty of care (modeled
after MUJI 8.8), and see the alternative "railroad" instruction set forth at MUJI 8.7.
The test proposed by the Goebels is not, contrary to Southern's suggestion, one
of "lack of concern." It is whether, in all the circumstances, and as a matter for jury
determination, Southern created or maintained a public nuisance, and whether
Southern acted or omitted to act in a manner that was unreasonable in the
circumstances. That Southern did not concern itself with the safety of bicyclists is one
of the factors that the jury should have been allowed to consider in determining
whether Southern acted unreasonably.
2.

THE "PERMANENT NATURE" OF THE HAZARD

As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, the Court should determine that
the nature of the condition in question was "permanent" and, accordingly, that the
Goebels were and are not required to put on proof of Southern's actual or constructive
knowledge of the condition. Contrary to Southern's argument, the Goebels do not
contend that "all gaps, even razor thin gaps" need to be removed. The idea is that,
7

A fundamental problem with the District Court's analysis, and with Southern's
argument, is that both the District Court and Southern seem erroneously to view this,
from a notice perspective, as nothing other than a traditional premises liability case.
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because of the very nature of the materials and crossing structure, there is a tendency
for gaps to continue to widen, subject to the seasonal expansion-and-contraction
phenomenon discussed above, and subject to the concept (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6094;
6117) that they do not continue to widen indefinitely. Once these things are
understood, there is no reason to treat this any differently from any other "permanent"
condition. All the imposition of such a duty on Southern in this case would require
Southern to do is to monitor the condition of the panels and, when any of the gaps
approach crucial size, to take reasonable and appropriate safety-oriented action.
Contrary to Southern's characterization, Gilton v. Hestonville M. & F. P. R. Co., 31
Atl. 249 (Pa. 1895) stands, for purposes pertinent to this discussion, for that very
proposition. So does the Wabash v. DeHart case discussed above, at 13. See, also.
Smith v. Morrow, 220 111. App. 627, 630 (111. App. 1921).
This Court, in a case relied on by Southern and the District Court, Fishbaugh v.
Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998), made an observation that is
instructive on the question of whether the gap-widening phenomenon constituted a
"permanent condition." In that case, which dealt with a malfunctioning street light
which had allegedly not been promptly fixed (like produce on a supermarket floor, and
unlike gaps between crossing panels, a transitory condition), this Court referred to a
putative, conceptually different situation "where a light post is neglected to such a
degree that the structure itself creates a hazard." 969 P.2d at 407. This is a situation
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where, at least as a matter of triable fact, Southern "neglected" the condition of the
crossing to such a degree that the crossing "itself create[d] a hazard." And this seems
to be a significantly stronger case for application of the "permanent" condition rule
than was the situation in Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 61 P.3d 287 (Utah 2002), where the
Utah Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in a situation where the
"permanent condition" was alleged to be the use of an electric cart in a store. The
questions of fact recognized to be pertinent to the inquiry in Carlile were whether the
use of electric carts presented a foreseeable danger and whether the defendant took
reasonable safety precautions to prevent injuries. Id. at 290. Here it has been
established that there was a foreseeable danger (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6104-05; R. 6765,
Tr. 623) and that Southern did not even inspect the crossings for the safety of
bicyclists and did not even concern itself with bicyclists' safety. R. 6065-68; 6167;
6178; 6194. The condition here was a "permanent condition"; Southern is, by reason
thereof, deemed to have known of the condition; and no further showing of notice is
necessary. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 476 (Utah 1996).
3.

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

Southern contends that the Goebels did not present evidence from which a jury
could reasonably infer that Southern had constructive knowledge (that is, that Southern
should have noticed the problem) and an opportunity to cure the problem. Southern
does not want to deal with the fact that the crossing had been in place for over four
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years and that there is no evidence that any agency other than normal wear and tear
and climatic influences caused the gap to get into its dangerous condition. Nor does
Southern want to deal with the fact that Mr. Martinez was at the scene two days before
the incident and that he then had the opportunity, had he cared about the safety of
bicyclists, to take note of what was, at least as a matter of reasonable inference, by
then a hazardous condition. With respect to the question of reasonable opportunity to
cure, this Court has held, in essence, that as little time as 18 minutes between notice of
a dangerous condition and the time an incident occurs provides, as a question of triable
fact, sufficient opportunity to cure. Bowen v. Riverton City,8 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah
1982). There is no reason to think, given the nature of how gaps progress to critically
dangerous sizes, that the subject gap had been in its dangerous condition for less than
18 minutes prior to the incident. At least as a matter of triable fact, Southern had not
only constructive notice of the problem, but also a reasonable opportunity to remedy it.
Contrary to Southern's protestation, the fact that Mr. Goebel and Mr. Collins
did not notice a hazard is not "extremely significant," especially when one understands
the dynamics of what bicycle riders are and are not, as suggested above, at 9-10,
expected to see. Nor does the fact that gaps "can form quickly" assist Southern. There
is no evidence in this case that the subject gap did "form quickly," and the scrape

8

Bowen is also significant for the Court's comment that "[reasonable persons might
differ as to whether the annual inspections conducted by Riverton City were sufficient
under the circumstances." Id. Southern never inspected for bicycle safety.
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marks that appear on the pads that appear in the exhibits referenced at p. 30 of
Southern's Brief have nothing to do with the gap Mr. Ingebretsen testified was the
incident gap. The large gap depicted at Ex. P-11 (the one with Mrs. Goebel's fingers
in it) was between panels with scrape marks, but the only evidence on the subject was
that that damage was "purely cosmetic" (R. 6065-68; 6213).
4.

THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
PROTUBERANCE

Southern understandably, from an adversarial perspective, relegates discussion
of the "protuberance" to subordinate status. It does so out of its recognition that, as
explained in the Goebels5 Opening Brief at 19, there is not even a question of notice
regarding that aspect of the Goebels5 case. But for the presence of the protuberance,
there is no reason to think that Mr. Goebel would have had reason to move to the left
of the fog line and encounter the gap. E.g., R. 6765, Tr. 660-66; 674; 697-700; Ex. P54. Southern's suggestion that the protuberance had nothing more to do with the
accident than Mr. Goebel's choice to ride a bicycle on the morning of the incident
misses the mark. Consider not only the analogy discussed in the Goebels' Opening
Brief at 20-21, and countless other ones that can reasonably be posited, but also the
observation of this Court in an analogous fact situation, in Braithwaite v. West Valley
City Corp., 860 P.2d 336, 338-39 (Utah 1993):
If, as plaintiffs assert, their child was killed because he was forced out into the
traffic lane due to a parked car and an encroaching fence, a material question of
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fact arises whether the City has discharged its obligation to provide reasonably
safe conditions for pedestrian travel.
The presence of the protuberance and Salt Lake Southern's negligence, with
clear constructive notice of it and opportunity to cure it, constituted, at least as a
question fit for jury determination, the requisite proximate cause connection. This has
significance not only with respect to the "2-foot rule" referenced in Utah Code Ann.
§§10-7-26(2) and -29 and the Salt Lake City ordinance, but also with respect to the
common law principle that an entity charged with the safety of railroad crossings has a
duty to keep the approaches to crossings, as well as the crossings themselves, in a
reasonably safe condition. E.g., Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 184 P. 641,
648 (Wash. 1919); Wichita V. R. Co. v. Meyers. 248 S.W. 444, 446 (Tex. App. 1922);
Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Woods. 262 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. App. 1924); Cincinnati H.
& I. R. Co. v. Claire, 33 N.E. 918, 920 (Ind. App. 1893). The Court should rule that
the District Court committed reversible error in determining, as a matter of law, that
there was no proximate cause connection between the protuberance and Mr. Goebel's
injuries.
5.

THE STATUTES AND THE ORDINANCE

It is well established, contrary to Southern's argument, that notice need not be
proved in situations in which the obligation of a railway or railroad company has been
affirmatively addressed by statute or ordinance. The parts of Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-
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26 and 10-7-29, and Salt Lake City ordinance 14.44.0309 relied on by the Goebels are
those kinds of positive law. Contrary to Southern's argument, those laws do not apply
only to dealings with the City and do not become triggered only in cases in which the
City directs the railroad or railway company to do something. They impose on railway
companies a duty to make and keep crossings and their immediate environs reasonably
safe. The fact that they do not expressly dispense with a notice requirement and the
fact that they do not expressly deal with gaps is of no particular significance.
Southern misses the point when it contends, at p. 34, that "Sections 56-1-1110
and 10-7-29 also do not impose strict liability on railroads." The Goebels do not
contend that any of the subject Utah statutes or the Salt Lake City ordinance imposes
"strict liability." The essence of the Goebels' contentions regarding those laws is that
their existence and applicability to railroad and railway companies, such as Salt Lake

9

The pertinent language of these statutes and Part A of that ordinance are set forth at
001-02 of the Goebels' Opening Brief. That ordinance, like those statutes,
incorporates the "2-foot rule" pertinent to the protuberance. Part B of that ordinance
provides, in pertinent part:
The portions of the street or alley surfaces to be so maintained by all such
railway companies shall include all the space between the different rails and
tracks and also the space outside the outer rail of each outside track for a
distance of two feet (2'), measured from the outside edge of the rail....
10

The District Court long before trial ruled (R. 364), at Southern's instance, that a
claim under that statute would be "superfluous and would add nothing to plaintiffs'
claims," and the Goebels thereafter, honoring the District Court's ruling, refrained
from pursuing, in the District Court proceedings, claims founded only on that statute.
20

City Southern Railroad Company, Inc., dispense with the notice requirement that is a
part of purely common law, non-"permanent condition" premises liability law. That is
the essence of what the York, Moreland, and Red cases cited by the Goebels in their
Opening Brief at 23 stand for. That principle has been accepted in numerous other
cases as well. See, e.g., Glasemann v. Erie R. Co., 130 A. 445, 446 (N.J. 1925); Raper
v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 36 S.E. 115, 115-16 (N.C. 1900); Worster v. The FortySecond St. and G.S.F.R. Co., 50 N.Y. 203, 205 (N.Y. 1872); Keitel v. St. Louis C. &
W.R. Co., 28 Mo. App. 657, 664 (Mo. App. 1888). Those cases all recognize that
violation of such statutes (which statutes - like the laws here at issue — do not
expressly dispense with the notice requirement) is, even absent a showing of actual or
constructive notice, enough to make out & prima facie case and to carry a case to a
jury. And some {e.g., Raper, 36 S.E. at 116) give good policy explanations for why
that is so. The idea appears to be that railroads interfere with public ways, and that
railroad companies have duties, because of that dynamic, that go beyond those of other
categories of land occupiers. It would certainly be contrary to public safety if this
Court should rule that, as a matter of law, a railroad company such as Southern can
turn a blind eye to the safety of bicyclists and then escape liability because it failed to
notice and remedy a dangerous condition.
The York case, among others dealing with similar statutes, is instructive with
respect to the Goebels' contention that the District Court erred in refusing to allow

21

them to pursue a claim under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11. That statute, again, provides:
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.
The York court explained:
Section 8914 of the [Ohio] general code, provides in substance, that a railroad
company shall maintain at every point where a public road, street, lane or
highway used by the public crosses its railroad, safe and sufficient crossings
and such company shall be liable for all damages sustained in person or
property by reason of the want or sufficiency of such crossing, or neglect or
carelessness in the construction thereof, or in keeping them in repair.
In light of that statutory language, quite similar to that of §56-1-11, and similar
in concept to that of the other pertinent Utah statutes and the Salt Lake City ordinance,
the York court determined that notice was not an additional element of a claim. What
needs to be proved under 56-1-11 is what is set forth in the statute and what appeared
in the jury instruction approved in Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 186 P.2d 293,
306 (Utah 1947) (set forth at p. 36 of the Goebels' Opening Brief). As the Court will
see, there is no discussion of notice in that instruction, and it is certainly not a "strict
liability" instruction.
The Court should take note of the following language from Louisville, N. A. &
C. R. Co. v. Red, 47 111. App. 662, 664-65 (111. App. 1892):
Railroad companies may be presumed to know the condition of the crossings
over which they run their trains, and if they see fit to operate them in cities at
places where the statutory obligation to have the public right of way safe, has
been neglected, they must, at the least, be held bound to exercise such diligence
as the safety of persons at the unsafe public way demands.
22

This principle, laid down more than a century ago, is not at odds with Utah law
and still makes sense. n Railroad companies' conducting operations in a manner (by
11

did or omission) that potentially jeopardizes the safety of the public is a matter of
significant public interest. Statutory and case law, from both Utah and elsewhere, has
developed in recognition of the proposition that railroads are obliged to take
affirmative action to keep their crossings reasonably safe for the public.
No reported Utah case appears directly to hold that a showing of notice is not
required in railroad crossing cases, but it is firmly established Utah law that violation
of a safety law (statute or ordinance) is prima facie evidence of negligence. E.g.,
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 533 (Utah 2000); Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv.,
Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998);
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Utah 1981); Gaw v. State of Utah, 798 P.2d
1130, 1135 (Utah App. 1990). The Goebels submitted a proposed jury instruction (R.
5953) setting forth that proposition. It is elementary trial procedure law that "a
defense motion for a directed verdict must be denied if the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case." 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial §984. The Goebels made out prima facie

11

See the proposed jury instruction (R. 5960) submitted by the Goebels and the
mention of it (R. 6760, Tr. 33) in the context of Southern's motion for directed verdict.
12

See the quotation from Oswald v. Utah L. & R. Co., 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911), set
forth in the Goebels5 Opening Brief, at 23, and not responded to by Southern in its
Brief.
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claims under Sections 10-7-26 and 10-7-29 and the Salt Lake City ordinance (and,
although the District Court's pre-trial ruling prohibited them from pursuing a
negligence-like claim founded on §56-1-11 and Southern's "neglect,"

1^

under that

statute as well). Those laws do not require notice to be established, and it was error
for the District Court to engraft such a requirement onto them.
"It is the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the right of trial by
jury and not to take issues from them and rule as a matter of law except in clear cases."
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Utah 1959). The
Goebels trust the Court will recognize, in the exercise of that zealous protection, that
this is not one of those rare cases.
C

THE DISTRICT COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF
TESTING DONE BY MR. INGEBRETSEN WAS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

The Goebels are not, contrary to Southern's characterization, asking this Court
to "make its own evidentiary ruling," with respect to the District Court's exclusion of
evidence pertaining to empirical testing done by Mr. Ingebretsen. The Goebels are
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Here is another definition of "neglect," from Black's Law Dictionary (7 ed. 1999):
The omission of proper attention to a person or thing, whether inadvertent,
negligent, or willful; the act or condition of disregarding.
As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, at 27, 34, Southern's conduct seems to
qualify as "neglect," as, at a bare minimum, a question of triable fact. Southern's
analysis of neglect, set forth at p. 34 of its Brief, has it backwards. The point is that
Southern cannot be expected ever to have had actual notice of something it
disregarded, or "neglected."
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urging the Court to recognize that there was no chance of a reasonably intelligent
jury's being misled or confused, and that the District Court's subject evidentiary ruling
was indeed so unreasonable that it should be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a
clear abuse of discretion. As explained in the Goebels' Opening Brief, and as seen in
the cross-examination of Dr. Woolley (R. 6766, Tr. 1041-45; R. 6767, Tr. 1059-62),
that witness's experiment was dissimilar in numerous ways from the particulars of the
subject incident. Yet the District Court allowed evidence of it and presumably will do
so again in the new trial. In all the circumstances, it was unfair and an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to disallow the Goebels' desired evidence from being
presented to the jury; and it would be unfair, on retrial, for that to occur again.
D

SOUTHERN OWED THE GOEBELS A DUTY, PURSUANT TO
§324A OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, AND
THE GOEBELS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF HOW SOUTHERN AND UTA CONSTRUED AND
APPLIED THEIR AGREEMENT.

To understand the Administration and Coordination Agreement the Court needs
to consider it in its entirety, including its recitals (set forth at 043-44 of the Addendum
to the Goebels5 Opening Brief). The Court also needs to understand that, at the time of
the incident, the "trackage" was "joint trackage" (id. at 045), inasmuch as there had
been no "reassignment" under section 2.3 (id. at 049-50), and no reason, because UTA
was not yet operating, to segregate the line between "freight" and "passenger"
trackage. Section 3.3 (id. at 051), which deals with "joint trackage," appears to be the
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language that directly addresses the situation in effect through the time of the incident.
It says nothing of the putative duty of UTA and deals only with the duty of Southern.
It concludes with the following:
Nothing herein shall relieve [Southern] of the obligation to perform
maintenance, repair and renewal on the Joint Trackage in a good and workmanlike manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
Contrary to Southern's contention, §324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
establishes a duty running from Southern to the Goebels. The most pertinent provision
of that Restatement section is the following:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking,
if
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person.
For UTA originally had a duty, as the landowner, or lessee, that ran to the
public, including the Goebels. Then, pursuant to the Agreement, Southern
"[undertook] to perform" UTA's duty to make and keep the crossing reasonably safe.
Southern's Mr. Martinez did maintenance work, not directly related to the movement
of freight, at other crossings along the same line (see, e.g., R. 6065-68; 6184-89); and
Southern's contention that it did not specifically undertake to eliminate unsafe gaps,
like its contention that the pertinent statutes and ordinance do not specifically make
illegal railway companies' failure to eliminate unsafe gaps, is cutting too fine a slice of
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bologna. Also, it would be a remarkable conclusion if Southern had the right to
perform operations and yet had no corresponding responsibility to the users of public
roadways that crossed the tracks on which Southern was operating and from which
operations Southern was presumably profiting. Finally, the Court may find instructive
Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1975). There, in reversing
a summary judgment, it held, in a situation where a plaintiff bicycle rider sustained
injuries when he encountered a hole in land that the defendant bank did not own but on
which it did work, explained:
The court apparently assumed that the Bank owed no duty to the plaintiff, since
it did not own the land wherein lay the hole. This is a false assumption. By
utilizing the area between the street and sidewalk and by undertaking to keep it
level, the Bank became charged with a duty to do so in a nonnegligent manner,
the same as if it had owned the land.
Id.
The Court should determine either that Southern owed the Goebels a duty of
care under the Agreement or that the Agreement was ambiguous, and the Goebels
should be allowed to present their desired evidence.
11.

SOUTHERN SHOULD NOT PREVAIL ON ANY OF ITS CROSSAPPEAL CONTENTIONS.
A,

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
SOUTHERN OWED THE GOEBELS DUTIES OF CARE
PURSUANT TO THE UTAH STATUTES AND THE SALT I \ ICE
CITY ORDINANCE.

Southern makes the argument, remarkable by reason of Southern's name and
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the operations it was conducting, that it is not a "railway" and not a "railroad" within
the purview of the pertinent Utah statutes and the pertinent Salt Lake City ordinance.
First, the thrust of the statutory and ordinance language (set forth at pages 001 and 002
of the Addendum to the Goebels' Opening Brief) makes it clear that the intent of those
positive laws is that a railroad company operating over tracks, especially when it has
long been the only one so operating and when it has had the only practical opportunity
to maintain and keep safe crossings and their immediate environs, owes duties of care
to the public. That is precisely the situation here, inasmuch as UTA had never actually
operated this or any other railroad. See, generally, the testimony of UTA5 s Crosby
Mecham (R. 6764, Tr. 567-79; R. 6765, Tr. 600-614), and see the proffers with respect
to Mr. Mecham's testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 587-94; 598-99). See, also, the testimony of
Mr. Martinez with respect to his inspection and maintenance obligation and work (R.
6065-68; 6184-89). See also the exhibits, not received in evidence, but proffered (R.
6767, Tr. 1149) by the Goebels (proposed Exs. P-75 and P-76), pertaining to the
communications between Southern and UTA regarding maintenance along the line.
The subject statutes and ordinance exist for the protection of the public. The
public could receive no protection from an entity such as UTA that, as a practical
matter and pursuant to the Agreement, was doing nothing on the land. Given those
considerations and the evidence that Mr. Martinez was doing crossing maintenance
work, how can Southern earnestly contend that UTA, and not Southern, had the duty
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to maintain the crossing?
The Court may wish to consider, as it analyzes Southern's contention that it was
not a railway company and not a railroad company, the various statutes included in
Title 56 (entitled "Railroads") of the Utah Code. For example, does §56-2-2, which
makes it unlawful for any railroad corporation or company "operating or in control of
the operation of any railroad" to haul defective rolling stock, not apply to Southern?
And consider §56-1-18.5, which insulates owners and operators of railroads against
certain kinds of claims. Would Southern hesitate to seek the protection of that statute?
No case that has come to the attention of the Goebels' counsel or, apparently,
Southern's counsel, supports the position advanced by Southern. A Utah case, Oregon
Short Line R. Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co.. 237 P.2d 829, 830 (Utah 1951),
suggests a connection between an entity that operates a railroad and that entity's status
as a carrier (i.e., one that, like Southern, moves people and/or things, even if it does
not own the land over which those people and things are moved). It is also of note that
the concurring opinion, id. at 831, referring to a part of the Utah Constitution, Art. XII,
§12, that has since been amended, notes that"... Utah has declared that all railroad
companies are common carriers that are required to receive and transport passengers
and freight."
In Stroble v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 31 N.W. 63, 66 (Iowa 1886), the
court observed:
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What is the use and operation of a railway? It is constructed for the sole
purpose of the movement of trains. That is its sole use. What is the operation
of a railway? They can be operated in no other way than by the movement of
trains.
This judicial pronouncement makes considerably more sense than Southern's strained
and unsupported contention, made in its Brief at 37, that "operate" means "control
access to." And, in any event, there was no evidence presented at trial that UTA was
"controlling access to" the crossing. Southern was, in the language of Utah Code Ann.
§10-7-26(1) and contrary to Southern's contention, the entity that was, and had been,
exclusively, for more than four years, "operating" the subject railway tracks. Also, for
purposes of the Salt Lake City Ordinance, "their tracks" means, in the circumstances,
Southern's tracks, because Southern held the Easement; and Southern is the one, and
the only one, that had been "operating." And, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. §56-111, "its road" means, for the same reason, Southern's road.
Additionally, and importantly, Southern pursuant to the Easement had and
exercised the right to occupy the land.14 With that interest in the land it was the
functional equivalent, for purposes of the statutes and ordinance, of the "owner" of the
property. Southern states, at p. 37:

14

UTA, having acquired the land from Union Pacific at the same time that the
Easement and the Agreement were executed, held what easement law considers to be
the "servient estate," while Southern, as the easement holder, held the "dominant
estate." For a discussion of the proposition that it is the holder of the dominant estate
rather than the holder of the servient estate that owes a duty of care to the public, see
Suterav.GoJokir.Inc, 86 F.3d 298, 301-02 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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It only makes sense that inasmuch as these provisions pertain to real property,
that the owners or those who control the use of the property (lessees) should
have the obligations concerning what is done with the property.
What really makes sense is that Southern, under the Easement and the Agreement, and
given what was really happening on the land, is the entity, or at least an entity,15 on
which should be imposed the safety obligations concerning the property.
The Court should rule that the District Court was correct in determining that
Southern owed the Goebels duties of care under the statutes and the ordinance.
B.

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT SOUTHERN'S CONTENTION
THAT IT COULD HAVE NO LEGAL DUTY TO MAKE AND
KEEP THE CROSSING REASONABLY SAFE WITH RESPECT
TO BICYCLE TRAVEL.

Southern contends that it could have no legal duty to make the crossing surface
so smooth that there would be no gap wide enough to accommodate any bicycle tire.
In making that contention, Southern is in essence ignoring the reality that many
thousands of people in the Salt Lake Valley regularly use bicycles for commuting, and
exercising, and recreational purposes, and that among their number are those who
traverse railroad crossings. It also ignores the proposition that a 3A" wide gap can be as
dangerous to a bicyclist as a 3" hole can be to a pedestrian or as a 10" hole can be to a

15

In the District Court proceedings, Southern contended that UTA had the sole safety
responsibility, and UTA contended that it was all Southern's responsibility. The
Goebels contended that both of those entities were responsible. If the Court now
determines that only Southern had the obligation, it will not be necessary for the jury
in the new trial to determine UTA's fault or percentage of causal fault, or to consider
the nuances of the Administration and Coordination Agreement.
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motorist. Dan Bergenthal, a Salt Lake City transportation engineer, testified with
respect to the importance of bicycle riding and the importance of safety of bicyclists.
R. 6763, Tr. 325-28.
The Goebels acknowledge that Southern did not have the duty to make and
keep the crossing surface and its environs (including the area where the protuberance
existed) in absolutely safe condition. But Southern had the duty to keep things
reasonably safe or, in the words of, for example, Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11, reasonably
"good and sufficient" for the safety of the traveling public. Whether Southern
discharged that duty is a quintessential jury question.
The cases from other jurisdictions cited by Southern are unavailing. Southern
does not bring to the Court's attention Utah law on the subject. In Shugren v. Salt
Lake City, 159 P. 530 (Utah 1916), this Court, in the course of analyzing the "trivial
defect" rule advanced by Southern, observed:
While there is much force to the contention that to hold a municipality liable for
a defect in the outlying residence districts, such as the one in question here,
where the municipality must of necessity maintain hundreds of miles of walks,
is enforcing a rather strict rule of liability against the municipality, yet, in our
judgment, such a rule in the long run is fair and more logical than is the one
adopted by some of the courts, whereby it is attempted to determine as a matter
of law that a defect of two, or one of two and one-half inches, or even more,
does not constitute such a defect as will make the municipality liable for
injuries sustained by persons falling over it. In all such cases courts are
compelled to adopt and enforce an arbitrary rule applicable to all cases, while if
the question is treated as one of fact, a jury of fair, practical men may determine
each case upon its own peculiar features or facts and circumstances.
Id. at 533.
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Cases construing Shugren have reached the same conclusion. In Ray v. Salt
Lake City, 69 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1937), this Court (acknowledging, as it did in
Shugren, that rare cases may warrant the taking of a sidewalk defect case from a jury)
stated:
In the very nature of the situation it must be obvious that the courts ought not
and cannot arbitrarily determine that the maintenance of a particular defect in a
street or sidewalk does or does not constitute neglect.
And, in Taylor v. Ogden City, 214 P. 311, 312 (Utah 1923), a crosswalk defect case,
this Court, citing Shugren, ruled that:
Whether the defect was dangerous or otherwise, or whether the street or
crosswalk was reasonably safe for travel or not, or whether the appellant had
exercised that degree of care required by the law as charged by the court, was
for the jury.
As explained in cases such as Raper v. Wilmington W. R. Co., 36 S.E. 115, 115-16
(N.C. 1900), and Wabash R. Co. v. DeHart 65 N.E. 192, 194-95 (Ind. App. 1902),
railroad crossings by their nature interfere with public highways and streets, and the
law for that reason mandates that railroad companies make and keep crossings
reasonably safe. Shugren and its progeny deal with the duties of municipalities with
respect to sidewalks and streets. The Court should perhaps be even less inclined in
this case than it was in those cases to rule, as a matter of law, that the subject defect
was so insignificant that the Goebels are not entitled to present their case to a jury.
Nor is the matter of supposed great expense to Southern of particular concern.
First, there is evidence that gaps wide enough to be dangerous can simply be filled (R.
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6065-70; 6109). Conspicuous warning signs can also be utilized. If reasonably
necessary, in the interest of public safety, crossing pads can be removed and
reinstalled. R. 6065-68; 6209. Further, with respect to Southern's contention about
the supposed expense (there was, in any event, no evidence regarding that
proposition), the Court may wish to consider Walden v. State of Montana, 818 P.2d
1190, 1194 (Mont. 1991), a case in which a bicyclist sustained a serious head injury
when the tires of his bike slipped into a longitudinal seam in a highway. There the
Montana Supreme Court approved the giving of a jury instruction that made it clear
that lack of funds or an inadequate number of employees was not a factor in the State's
duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition.
Mr. Goebel is suffering, living proof of the significance of the defect in
question, and it is unfair for Southern to contend that that defect was "trivial."
Southern makes the remarkable argument, at p. 39, that "[a]s a matter of public
policy, the burden of preventing accidents from small gaps in seams at railroad
crossings should be placed on bicyclists where it most reasonably belongs." Southern
would apparently have the Court accept the proposition that a bicyclist who is utterly
without fault, as may have been the case with Mr. Goebel, and who encounters a gap
that he is not even able to see without nearly stopping and inspecting (that was
Southern's job), should be unable to recover, in any circumstances, if his bike tire
should travel into a gap and he should consequently sustain a catastrophic injury.
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Such a result would not only seem to be grossly unfair to bicyclists but also to give
railroad companies a free pass and to encourage them to ignore the danger that their
lack of care can cause. How could that result be good law or good public policy?
C.

CONTRARY TO SOUTHERN'S ARGUMENT, THE SUBJECT
INCIDENT WAS, AS A MATTER OF TRIABLE FACT,
REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.

Reasonable foreseeability is a quintessential jury question. That no witness
who testified in this case had heard of another railroad crossing surface gap-related
bicycle accident should not end the inquiry. As noted above, Chuck Collins testified
that he was aware of other analogous accidents. So did David Ingebretsen. R. 6766,
Tr. 875. Also, it will never be known what mishaps, or near mishaps, other bicyclists
have had while traversing and attempting to traverse crossings, including but not
limited to the subject crossing. For example, a lucky person might have encountered
such a gap and not been injured or not seriously injured or may have been injured but
not have made a claim. Perhaps more importantly, Omni's Mr. Nutting testified that
this kind of an incident was foreseeable. R.6065-70; 6104-05. And Southern's
Mr. Jackson acknowledged that he knew it could happen. R. 6765, Tr. 623. Perhaps
most importantly, this Court has laid down the law, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d
723, 728 (Utah 1985), a case not brought to the Court's attention by Southern, that the
mere fact that a particular kind of accident has not happened before does not make it,
as a matter of law, unforeseeable.
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The picture of Southern as one grasping at straws in this Appeal is perhaps best
exemplified by the following sentence, which appears at pp. 40-41 of Southern's Brief:
A ruling that [Southern] had a duty to remedy the alleged gap in the subject
crossing also would require a finding that [Southern] should have foreseen that
Mr. Goebel would ignore his obligation to exercise care for his own safety.
First, it is far from a foregone conclusion that Mr. Goebel was at all negligent.
Second, the Court's acceptance of this argument would be tantamount to the Court's
accepting a defendant's argument, in a vehicular collision case, that a plaintiffs fault,
however slight in percentage, renders a defendant ipso facto non-liable. The law
simply does not work that way.
D.

CONTRARY TO SOUTHERN'S REMARKABLE CONTENTION,
THERE WAS DIRECT EVIDENCE, AND EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD INFER, THAT THE
GAP WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT.

Southern continues, at p. 42, to rely on the measurements that were taken of the
subject gap in the middle of the summer. The man, David Stephens, who took the
measurements, candidly acknowledged that he does not know what they would have
been in February. R. 6767, Tr. 1185. As noted above, every witness who discussed
the question agreed that gaps are wider in the wintertime than in the summertime, as a
function of the change in temperature. The measurements taken by Mr. Ertel (Ex. P13; R. 6762, Tr. 180) support the proposition that the gap was wide enough on the day
of the incident. He was not, contrary to Southern's contention, measuring only the
"ends" of the gap. And the gap does not appear to have been "hourglass"-shaped at
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the time of the incident. E.g., R. 6766, Tr. 821; Ex. P-10. Observations made by
Mr. Ertel (R. 6762, Tr. 180-81) support the proposition that it was deep enough.
Southern's statement that "gaps most often are filled with debris" is a misstatement.
Mr. Ingebretsen testified (R. 6765, Tr. 770-71) that, in his trips around the Salt Lake
Valley looking generally at gaps debris situations, he encountered the whole gamut,
some that were completely filled, some that were completely empty, and some that
were in between. Southern is reaching, especially given the lack of any other plausible
explanation for the incident, when it asks the Court to speculate that the subject gap
could have become dangerous only after the incident or filled with debris at the time of
the incident.16
Southern makes a bold statement at p. 43, under heading E: "There Was No
Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap, Assuming It Existed, Was The Cause Of
Mr. GoebePs Accident." That statement is made in the face of direct evidence on that
point. Mr. Ingebretsen, who carefully analyzed the situation and who thoroughly
considered all possible explanations, ruled out everything but the gap in question.
Dr. Woolley, Southern's expert, offered a different explanation (that Mr. Goebel went
off to the right of the road and struck an exposed rail or a curb face at the far end of the

16

Southern erroneously contends that Mr. Ingebretsen "testified that the wheel had to
travel the full 21" length of the one-eight gap ... to be able to fall far enough to make
the impact with the rail significant." See R. 6766, Tr. 867-74; 927-47; 969-75; and R.
6767, Tr. 1100-05, for Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony regarding the wheel-descent
dynamics.
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crossing). Dr. Woolley's explanation makes no sense, given not only
Mr. Ingebretsen's explanation but also such things as where Mr. Goebel ended up (see
the X on Ex. P-9 (smaller copy included in the Addendum hereto, at 022), and see the
testimony from the paramedic, Jeffrey Clark (R. 6763, Tr. 225)). Both Mr. Roberts
(R. 6762, Tr. 160) and Mr. Clark (R. 6763, Tr. 227) testified that the picture of
Mr. Goebel's having been riding way over to the right (north) of the crossing surface
made no sense. And Mr. GoebePs own account (of going to the left of the
protuberance) also rules that out. Dr. Woolley's only other suggestion was the
thoroughly speculative one that there was some phantom object in the roadway that
disappeared before anybody could see it. Mr. Roberts looked for such an object but
did not see one. R. 6762, Tr. 140-41. Nor did Mr. Clark. R. 6763, Tr. 233. And there
was, as a matter of reasonable jury inference,17 based on all the evidence, no plausible
explanation for the incident other than that given by Mr. Ingebretsen. Southern's
contention that there was no evidence to support the gap scenario is not only
remarkable. It may be an indication of the overall weakness of Southern's position in
this litigation. Southern appears to be firing indiscriminate arrows, hoping that one
will somehow pierce the heart of the Goebels' case and cause the Goebels again to be
denied their long-sought and once nearly attained jury decision. This Court should not

17

See the jury instruction (R. 5891) agreed upon by the Goebels and Southern,
regarding circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.
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allow Southern to succeed in its effort to continue to frustrate the Goebels' quest for
justice.
III.

THE CITY HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED, BECAUSE IT
CANNOT, THE GOEBELS9 CONTENTION THAT MR. GOEBEL IS
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
A RULING THAT HE CAN PROCEED TO TRIAL AGAINST THE
CITY.
A.

THIS IS NOT A "STRICT COMPLIANCE'9 CASE.

The City makes much, in its Brief, of the concept of "strict compliance" with
the Governmental Immunity Act. The Goebels understand the significance of "strict
compliance." Even though the City unquestionably had timely notice of Mr. Goebel's
claim, denied the claim less than a month after it was submitted, and litigated the case
for three years before attempting to have Mr. Goebel's claim dismissed for supposed
failure to comply with the recipient-of-notice provision of the Act, the Goebels
acknowledge that Mr. Goebel was not in compliance if the Court determines that the
1998 amendments should be retroactively applied. The Court need not, in other
words, even consider the notion that this is yet another attempt by a plaintiff to avoid
the "strict compliance" rule. Mr. Goebel did "strictly comply" with the law that
should govern this dispute: the law that was in effect at the time his claim arose.
B.

THE COURT SHOULD, TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PRIOR
CASE LAW, DETERMINE THAT THE STATUTORY CHANGES
WERE "SUBSTANTIVE" AND REVERSE THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

The City erroneously contends that Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah
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1988), is inapposite. It makes that contention on the supposed basis that the postincident statutory change in Schultz "imposed a statute of limitations for certain claims
where, prior to the change, there was none." Clearly, there was some statute of
limitations that governed Ms. Schultz's claim. The real question was whether she had
to file a pre-suit notice of claim as a prerequisite to her filing suit. It could certainly be
argued, contrary to the City's contention, that the entire thrust of the statutory change
in Schultz was "procedural" - i.e., that it required a claimant, after the change went
into effect, to go through the "procedure" of a pre-suit claim, whereas, prior to that
statutory change, a claimant needed to follow no such "procedure" - and that the
subject 1998 changes simply fine-tuned that "procedure." Yet this Court appears in
Schultz to have treated the statutory amendment there at issue to be "substantive" and
expressly mentioned the status of the law as of the time "the claim arose." The Court
should rule that the subject statutory changes were just as "substantive" as that
mentioned in Schultz, determine that those changes should not be retroactively
applied, and, accordingly, reverse the summary judgment.
C.

THE CITY'S MECHANICAL "PROCEDURAL" VS.
"SUBSTANTIVE" ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED.

The City, failing to respond to the subject matter jurisdiction part of the

It was (see paragraph 7 of the District Court's Conclusions of Law, set forth at page
2 of the Addendum to the City's Brief; and see the first sentence of the Conclusion of
the City's Brief) on the basis of supposed lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the
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Goebels' analysis, urges the Court to accept the mechanical argument that, (1) because
the statutory changes in question simply made clear who, in City government, is to be
the recipient of a notice of claim, the change is purely procedural, and (2) because
other decisions of this Court have held that purely procedural changes may be applied
retroactively, the District Court was correct in ruling that the subject changes should
be applied retroactively and in granting summary judgment.
In none of the cases in which this Court has held that purely procedural changes
may be applied retroactively is there even a discussion of subject matter jurisdiction.
It can fairly be said that in those cases (e.g., Evans & Southerland Computer Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997); Pilcher v. Department of Soc.
Serv., 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)) the changes were not only purely procedural but also
merely procedural. In no Utah case has it been determined that a change in the law
that could divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction should be applied retroactively.
Yet that is what this Court's affirmance of the summary judgment would mean.
Another hypothetical situation for the Court to consider, in addition to that
suggested in the Goebels' Opening Brief at 47, is the following: in 1996, another
person is injured; that person, with an unquestionably valid claim, files, within a year
of the date of her injury, her notice of claim with an unquestionably appropriate

District Court granted the City's motion for summary dismissal of Mr. Goebel's
claims.
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representative of the "governing body of the political subdivision" in question; her
claim is denied; she files her lawsuit in timely fashion; the case is litigated toward trial
or settlement; and then, come May 4, 1998, the law is changed to require service of the
notice on a representative of the political subdivision different from the one she
served. If that change is applied retroactively to the date of her injury, her claim,
through no even arguable fault of her or her legal counsel, will have evaporated.
Because of the fundamental jurisprudential significance of subject matter jurisdiction,
and because the subject matter jurisdiction defense can be raised at any time, that is the
result that affirmance of the summary judgment would mandate.
The City cites Hall v. Utah State Dept, of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, in support
of its contention that the Goebels' concern about where affirmance of the summary
judgment could lead is illusory.19 Footnote 1 of Hall states:
Changes to two sections of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act
became effective on May 3, 1999, after entry of the trial court's final order. See
Utah Code Ann. §§67-21-4 & 5 (Supp. 1999). The changes are not relevant to
the issues before us.
The City would apparently have the Court conclude that what it by that footnote
intended to say was that the changes there in question were not relevant because they

19

The City's suggestion that this Court would not condone "such an unreasonable
proposal or result" is interesting. For the City is itself advancing in this litigation a
contention that relies, given the City's actual notice of the claim, denial of the claim,
and lengthy litigation of the claim, on a very technical proposition, one that in a sense
has nothing much to do with "reason."
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were made after entry of the trial court's final order. The Court could just as well have
been saying that the changes were not relevant because they did not conceptually deal
with any of the issues there before the Court. Also, there is no reason to think that the
statutory sections of Tile 67 of the Utah Code there referenced raised any subject
matter jurisdiction concerns.
Footnote 2 of Hall states:
Subsequent to Hall's institution of his suit in court, the legislature adopted a
number of amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act, including two
changes to the state statute's notice of claim provision, Utah Code Ann. §63-3012. These changes are immaterial to our analysis in the case at hand and thus
do not affect the result.
(Emphasis added.) Again, the City apparently wishes the Court to conclude that what
that footnote intended to convey was that because the changes in question (similar to
the ones that are at issue in this case) were made after Mr. Hall's suit was instituted,
they had no significance to the Court's analysis. A more careful reading of the
footnote, focusing on the word "immaterial" in the footnote's last sentence, should
cause the Court to reject the City's contention with respect to the supposed
significance of that footnote. The reason that the changes mentioned by the Court in
footnote 2 were immaterial to the analysis is, apparently, that the problem with
Mr. Hall's notice of claim was not that he arguably served the wrong governmental
entity representative but that (24 P.3d at 966) he filed his notice of claim at the same
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time that he filed suit, rather than delaying filing of suit for the period mandated by
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14.
Suffice it to say that if the Court intended by the footnotes in Hall to say what
the City suggests, that would create a substantial inconsistency in Utah law, given the
established principle that the subject matter jurisdiction defense can be raised at any
time.
The City misses the mark, regarding the hypothetical scenario presented by the
Goebels in their Opening Brief at 47, when i1 protests that
those facts are not present in this matter since the Goebels were clearly not in
compliance with the Notice of Claim provision of the Governmental Immunity
Act at the time they filed their notice and they did not obtain a judgment against
the City that, as a result of the 1998 amendment, was taken away from them.
City's Brief at 12. When this Court decides cases, it establishes the law that will
govern future disputes. The point of the example used by the Goebels in their Opening
Brief is, like the one used hereinabove, to show where the Court's ruling will lead if it
ignores the subject matter jurisdiction aspects of this case and affirms the summary
judgment.
The City does not dispute the proposition that the Court's hands are not tied by
any Utah statute or by any of its previous decisions. Pursuant to Schultz and/or in
light of subject matter jurisdiction considerations, the Court should rule that the
subject statutory changes are not applicable to Mr. Goebel's claim and reverse the
summary judgment.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities and those set forth in their

Opening Brief, the Goebels urge the Court to reverse the District Court's rulings in
question and to remand with fitting directives, including that the Goebels shall be
allowed to present their claims against both Southern and the City to a new jury.
Respectfully submitted this / >

day of October, 2003.
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ADDENDUM

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
SANDY FRANGER
The Salt Lake City Southern
Railroad Co. , Inc.
C/O RaiilTex
404 0 Broadway, Suite 200
San Antonio, Texas 78209

PERMANENT FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT

FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT

i lfFreight Easement")

granted as of March 31, 1993, by the UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as "UPRR")
to THE SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD CO-, INC., a Texas
corporation

(hereinafter "SLS") .

WHEREAS, pursuant to that certain Assignment:, Assumption and
Indemnity Agreement between UPRR, as Assignor, and SLS, as
Assignee, dated as of March 31, 1993 (the "Assignment
Agreement") , UPRR has assigned and conveyed to SLS assets
necessary for certain freight railroad operations on certain
railroad line generally referred to as UPSR's Provo Subdivision
Line and Lovendahl Spur (which Is more specifically described
below and referred to herein is the "Right-of-way") ;
r

rvHEREAS, UPRR and Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA")

have heretofore entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated
as of October 30, 1992, covering UPRR's sale to UTA of the Rightof-way described in Section 1,1 hereof;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the aforesaid Purchase
Agreement UPRR's deed to UTA conveying the Right-of-way to UTA,

f i j PLAINTIFFS

UPRR r e s e r v e d u n t o i t s e l f a R e t a i n e d F r e i g h t O p e r a t i n g Easement
over t h e Right-of-Way described i n Section 1 . 1 hereof.
WHEREAS, p u r s u a n t t o t h e terms o f t h e P u r c h a s e Agreement
b e t w e e n UPRR a n d UTA, UPRR h a s a g r e e d t o g r a n t t o SLS a f r e i g h t
r a i l r o a d o p e r a t i n g easement on t h e R i g h t - o f - w a y ,

i n order t o

e n a b l e SLS t o p r o v i d e common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e on t h e
Right-of-Way.
NOW, THEREFORE, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e s ,
reservations,

c o v e n a n t s and u n d e r t a k i n g s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e

P u r c h a s e A g r e e m e n t , UPRR h e r e b y g r a n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g e a s e m e n t t o
SLS:

1-

GRANT OF FREIGHT EASEMENT

1.1

S u b j e c t t o t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s h e r e o f ,

UPRR h e r e b y

g r a n t s t o SLS a r a i l f r e i g h t easement f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f
providing

common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h r s e r v i c e t o a l l f r e i g h t

customers

on t h e following

Right-of-way:

UP f s freight railroad line located between Ninth Street
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH
STREET, Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost
798.74) and the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary
l i n e (approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Short line
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting
Valuation Maps;
UPf s spur freight railroad line which departs in a
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line
a t approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the
3/29/93 Ease Frt.5
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1-15 freeway and the D&JRGW Railroad main line, and then
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of intersection with the DSRGW right of way
(approximately milepost 1.402), a dis-tance of about 1,4
miles, as shown on the DP's Chief Engineer's Alignment
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps Lands a3ca Property Accounting Valuation Maps.
Ttiat portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) whicht extends
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the DPRR
RigJht-Of-Way and running from approximately ISO East to 19o
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a* small
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length
from north to south is approximately 2.560 feet;
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated
between 5410 and 533 0 South Streets at 3 00 West and which is
approximately 2500 feet "long and 125 feet wide;
BDT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A" HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT
EASEMENT WAS RESERVED AND AS TO WHICH NO EASEMENT IS GRANTED
HEREBY

3 2

Th i s Fr eigh t: Easement is for common ca rrier rail

freight service on the Right-of-way.

The Freight Easement shall

grant SLS the exclusive right *

conduct freight railroad

operatmn . on thti kighl •ui•w. .,

u! i*h<i J ! nut be construed to

prohibit cr limit non-freight uses

by other parties, which shall

not unreasonably interfere with SLSfs permitted use.

Said

easemen t includes the right to operate with SLS's trains,
locomotives, rail cars and rai 1 equipment with SLS's own crews
over the Right-of-Way for t he pu rposes thp s*?f: fort* " • th i
Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right

ooerate

trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over the Right-

3/29/93 Sase_Fr?.S
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of-Way s h a l l be an exclusive right to the occupancy and use of
the Right-of-Way only with respect to r a i l freight operations and
SLS acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit Authority ("DTA")
or i t s d e s i g n e e s h a l l have the right to the occupancy and a l l
other u s e s of the Right-of-Way.
1.3

The conveyance of t h i s Freight Easement by UPRR t o SLS

i n c l u d e s any and a l l r i g h t s and obligations of UPRR under f e d e r a l
law t o conduct common carrier r a i l freight s e r v i c e .
1.4

This Freight Easement granted by UPRR in t h e Right-of-

Way i n c l u d e s a r i g h t of entry over the Right-of-Way for any and
a l l SLS employees, agents or representatives, machinery, v e h i c l e s
or equipment which SLS reasonably may deem necessary or
convenient for the purposes of inspecting the Right-of-Way,
d e s i r i n g any derailments or wrecks of SLS t r a i n s on the Right-ofWay or otherwise conducting SLS r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e over the
Right-of-Way in accordance with t h i s Freight Easement.
1.5

This Freight Easement i s subject t o the terms,

c o n d i t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s of the separate Administration and
Coordination Agreement between SLS and UTA and a l s o the following
terms and c o n d i t i o n s :
At any time a f t e r the f i f t h anniversary of the c l o s i n g
of UPRR's s a l e t o UTA, UPRR has the r i g h t , upon t h i r t y
(3 0) days advance written notice, to repurchase the
F r e i g h t Easement described herein, or t o designate a
t h i r d party t o purchase the Freight Easement described
h e r e i n , for the amount of $5,000 payable t o SLS.
S i m i l a r l y , a f t e r the f i f t h anniversary of the c l o s i n g ,
SLS s h a l l have the right, after ninety (90) days
advance w r i t t e n notice, to e l e c t to terminate i ~ s
o p e r a t i o n s under the Freight Easement, e i t h e r by
abandonment/discontinuance of s e r v i c e , or through a
3/29/93 Base F r t . 5
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s a l e o f S L S ' s r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e F r e i g h t
E a s e m e n t , p r o v i d e d however, t h a t s u c h s a l e o r
a b a n d o n m e n t / d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of SLS's o p e r a t i o n s u n d e r
t h e F r e i g h t Easement s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o ICC a p p r o v a l .
UPKR a n d a n y UPKR a s s i g n e e s h a l l u s e i t s / t h e i r b e s t
e f f o r t s t o a s s i s t SLS i n l o c a t i n g a s u c c e s s o r
r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a b l e t o UPRR or any UPRR a s s i g n e e , and
i n s u p p o r t i n g any a p p l i c a t i o n o r p e t i t i o n f o r e x e m p t i o n
f o r a b a n d o n m e n t / d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of s e r v i c e .
1.6

UPRR h a s t h e r i g h t t o a s s i g n i t s i n t e r e s t s

F r e i g h t Easement,

including without l i m i t a t i o n ,

in th i s

the rights

in

Sectio
TERM AND TERMINATION
T h i s F r e i g h t Easement s h a l l t e r m i n a t e and b e
a n d a 1,1 i: e a J

extinguished

p r o p e r t y r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o SLS her e u n d e i

shall

i n t h e o w n e r o f t h e Right-of-Way upon t h e . t e r m i n a t i o n ,
t o a n o r d e r o f t h e I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Commission

v est

pursuant

(Z.C.C.),

of

common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e on "the R i g h t - o f - W a y o r amy
part thereof;
Freight

p r o v i d e d , however, t h a t a t e r m i n a t i o n o f

E a s e m e n t p u r s u a n t t o s u c h an o r d e r s h a l l

those sections

apply only

o f t h e Right-of-Way s u b j e c t t o s u c h I . C . C .

The t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of ' t h i s S e c t i o n 2 - 2 s h a l l
a t-!r:rii ru-itii.ifi ui
transfer

of

this

its

r\:i I 1 f r e i g h t

not

s e r v i c e by SLG d o n e a s p a r t

to

order.
apply
of a

common c a r r i e r f r e i g h t r i g h t s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s

a s u c c e s s o r or

to

to

assign.

11 ;i WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o h a v e c a u s e d t h i s
F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t t o be e x e c u t e d as a s e a l e d i n s t r u m e n t a s of
date f i r s t

set

f o r t h above by t h e i r d u l y

authorized

representatives.
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the

Attest:

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Assistant Secretary

Title:

&C&csr"<z

s+5psr<+

^r

Acknowledged:
Th<^ S a l t LaJce C i t y S o u t h e r n R a i l r o a d C o - , I n c . ,
By:
Title:

VJ^AJ

<,C/-7Ul~*
l ^ ^ ^ ^ .

STATE OF NEBRASKA

)

COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

)

)

ss:

On the O 0 day of March, 1993, personally appeared before
<^> cu. SStYt-9'**

me

and

A. A

S CAfz>«^ 7" J.

who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he,
c
the said
* w- S^Yc^^s
is the Assistant
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that he, the
said
/*\ ^ xc^b^z. T2is the ^ ^ $-T?r r~* £' VS<3
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said
<£, ut. J>y^^-f
X- /£ £c/j-vw<s r 2and
each
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same
and that the seal
affixed is the seal of said corporation A GOTERAL MJLWY-Sfclf of fetasb
p|

HUTHA.HOWfcflD

y>

«5Jg^» Myf Ccmra. Exo. Nov. 5,1955

res
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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. M y residence

is

STATE (JF UTAH

)

)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

SS:

On the /£7_ day of Osy<dl^
1993, personally appeared
before me David P. Valentine who being by me duly sworn did say
that he is the Vice-President of The Salt Lake City Southern
Railroad Co., Inc., and that the within and foregoing instrument
was signed in behalf of The Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co.,
Inc. by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and*'
said David P. Valentine duly acknowledged to me that The Salt
Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc. .Executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC

*3%fri?JW& ftft¥/S''mS • *««"•»«

iS

'Astp

WILLIAM 6. OSWALD 1
S7W*Kt2CGSarfi#5G0 1
Se*L*te CftJMti S41Ct I

3/29/93 £*s* r r t . 5
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EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLSfS FREIGHT EASEMENT
UP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOOTH STREET,
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798.74) and
tiie Salt Lake Coxxnty/TJ-tah
County boundary line
(approximately
milepost
775 . 19)
consisting
of
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP f s Chief
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting
Valuation Maps;
UP' s spur freight railroad line which departs in a
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line
at
approximately
6400
South
in
Murray,
Utah
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the
1-15 freeway and the D&RGW Railroad main line, and then
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of
intersection with
the
D&RGW
right
of
way
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4
miles, as shown on the UPfs Chief Engineer's Alignment
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which
extends from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the
UPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to
190
East; the east-west width of this property
is
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a
small portion on the north end which is narrower-, and its
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets, at 300 West
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide.
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWXNG DESCRIBED
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO
T^iZ FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT:
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES

- 8-
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(Exhibit "A" continued)

a n Lace Me-1d1an, and mom fully described as follows, to-*it:
f h T r S " 3 ( l 1 , a S J 2 Z&ft**'****

M4 thirty urinrtas V a n I S ? ^ 1

S"" t e r

llne

°f " " ' a c t i o n "

H£» ? 1 1 ,'? a ? : ? e n c a

-S£2 S T S ^ S S T f g ^ S t ^
hundredths fioiie) ££?? «?
I S *

1

N o r t h n a de

9rea*

? ' S S - &>?£&
el hty-one
? """"dred one and fifteen

si-y-eight hundredths (233.63) feet to the place of beginning?"

R 1W P c ^ fnu ^ f e 2 t w i d e ' l n t h e N a r t h e ^ t 1/4 of Section 13,- T.2S
d1an
nri*i:+ s •h Jt ^ - B aas ye afn tdhMer1
e O*
r e g o n» S ^
h onr t* U^n t
e of and adjacent to the
h^n^r
JJ * ?
i n r o a d Conic any. Said j u rip
being more particularly described as follows:
"
?2S &?rt-2 J K len »Nor18u4 f e S t j m ° r e °-r T e s s ' W e s t a n d 311 feet, mare or
the l a ? rLSI X
theast^corner or said Section 13, said pointfaelnaon
the
a o r t U n e
the o S L r ? ?
Vf ?1?t s 11
° r ! ga0tn toe
i n r o a d SO fest from
n "?
i n °T,
llne
2 2 4 2 ^ 5 e il* °
' *"<*
Southwest corner of the
nap*™*? J" 'ttng and Refining Company's property; thence South a°30' W.
S H 2 r f S S f f°* n B e r 9 e r s l a n d ' 1 0 1 - 4 f e £ t ; thence March 0°30E., parallel
f S - S d t i ^ f 8 f l E 0 ?<J , ^ C 8 n t e r l 1 n e ° f 0 r a 3° n Short-Une main I n , 1687
feet, thence South 33 30W. 100.8 feet to the place of beginning.

- 9
OftOQ

(Exhibit "A:' continued)

The following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part
of the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6), in
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian.
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10} rods East from the Northwest corner of said
l o t thre— thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and
s i x t y (160) rods; thence West nineteen 40A00 rods; thence West one hundred
and sixty (160) rods to the place of beginning.
Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of property, which are included wichii
t h e R e t a i n e d F r e i g h t Operating Easement:

1. That portion within the bounds of the existing single
line through track which is approximately 66 feet in width.
2
That portion of the land lying between the single line
through track and 14 feet East and abutting the cent P T line of ^
the Easterly most track of the existing siding track sxtaatac xn
Lets 4 0 , 49, and 62, Sandy Station Plat-
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Ken Ocken
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Law Department - Room 830
1416 Dodge street
Omaha, NE 68179

TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
LIBRARY COPY
DIVISION.
TITLE.

UPKR

/\ ouS

RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT ( " F r e i g h t

Easement")

r e t a i n e d b y t h e Union P a c i f i c R a i l r o a d Company, a Utah
corporation

1

'

( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s "UP").

RSSERVaTH-QN
1-1

0 F

FPT-TGHT EASEKFWf

DP h e r e b y r e s e r v e s a r a i l f r e i g h t e a s e m e n t f o r t h e

p u r p o s e o f p r o v i d i n g common c a r r i e r r a i l f r e i g h t s e r v i c e t o a l l
freight
l.l(a)

c u s t o m e r s on t h e Right-Of-Way

(as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n

o f t h e P u r c h a s e and S a l e Agreement b e t w e e n UP and Utah

T r a n s i t A u t h o r i t y d a t e d a s o f t h e 3 0 t h day o f O c t o b e r ,

19S2) .

The r e a l p r o p e r t y t o which t h i s F r e i g h t Easement r e l a t e s i s
described

as;

U P ' s f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d l i n e l o c a t e d b e t v e - r . »*«•*.* e+.
7 o « 5 j ( S a i t L a k e C i t y ' u t a i l ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y miTeno<rtS a l t LaJce Co
™nk rl a n d ^
^ / U t a h County^oSdSv
u n e
(fFProxxmately mileoost 775.19)
c o n s i s H n r ^ ^
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 23.55 miles, a s s h o w n ' o S S S u£?f £ * . E n g i n e e r ' s A l i g n m e n t Macs o f t h e Union P a J , - S L J ? ^
S u b d i v i s i o n L i n e and as" shown on S e Orlaon
lno2?7°

XiSS^^ST M a p s " L a n d s •* ^ p ^ - c o ° ^ g e
a z a p p r o x i m a t e d &Ann C^H-K <- Z..ZZ°

° f^ivision

Line

onn

heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way
(approximately milepost 1*402}, a distance of about 1.4
miles, as shown on the DPfs Chief Engineerfs Alignment
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps Lands a3ca Property Accounting Valuation Maps*
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which extends
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the DPRR
Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 190
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a" small
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length
from north to south is approximately 2560 feet;
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated
between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West and which is
approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide;
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT lfAw HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT
EASEMENT IS RESERVED.
1•2

This Freight Easement shall be for common carrier rail

freight service on the Right-Of-Way and by this Freight Easement
UP reserves the exclusive right to conduct freight railroad
operations on the Right-Of-Way, but this Freight Easement shall
not be construed to prohibit or limit other non-freight uses by
other parties.

Said easement includes the right to operate with

UP's trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment with UP's
own crews over the Right-Of-Way for the purposes the set forth in
tllls

Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right to

operate trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over
the Right-Of-Way shall be an exclusive right to the occupancy and
use cf the Right-Of-Way only with respect to rail freight
operations and UP acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit
3/29/93 Zasemnt:3.ret:
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or i^s designee s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o t h e

occupancy and use of the Right-Of-Way for Passenger Operations
and a l l o t h e r uses*
e s e r v a t i o n of t h i s Freight Easement by UP i n c l u d e s
a r e s e r v a t i o n •/:. any and a l l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of UP under
federal

'

.

ijojinii-un c a r n - n i ai, 1 f r e i g h t s e r v i c e t o

f r e i g h t customers along t h e Right-Of-Way.
1.4

T h e r e s e r v a t i o n of t h i s F r e i g h t E a s e m e n t

reservation

includes

u ri'jlit. nt, t'jit.ry over t h e R i g h t ~C3£ -Way f o r a n y a n d

a l l UP e m p l o y e e s , a g e n t s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , m a c h i n e r y ,

vehicles

o r ' e q u i p m e n t w h i c h DP r e a s o n a b l y may deem n e c e s s a r y or

convenient

for

t h e p u r p o s e s of i n s p e c t i n g t h e R i g h t - O f - W a y ,

derailments

o r w r e c k s of DP t r a i n s on t h e R i g h t - O f - W a y

o t h e r w i s e c o n d u c t i n g UP r a i l f r e i g h t
Wai

:i i

accordance with t h i s Freight

1.5
conditions

clearing

service

i""1: forr.r

or

ove-' \-::\* F i g h t - O f -

Easement.

T h i s F r e i g h t Easement i s s u b j e c t
and l i m i t a t i o n :

any

to the

terms,

in t.n*j Pu.rcha.se A g r e e m e n t

b e t w e e n UTA a n d DP.

2.

TERM MID

TERMINATI0N

T h i s F r e i g h t Easement s h a l l terminate and be e x t i n g u i s h e d
and a l l r e a l property r i g h t s and other r i g h t s r e s e r v e d t o DP
h e r e u n d e r shai I vest in tlit- /junior o;: the Right-Of-Way in the
e v e n t of t e r m i n a t i o n , pursuant to an order of the I n t e r s t a t e
Commerce Commission ( I . C . C . ) f of common carrie"- r.

. freight,

s e r v i c e on "l",.l:je Right-Of-Way or any part, t h e r e o f ; p r o v i d e d ,
3 / 2 9 / 9 3 2asemnt3. ret,

'

-
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however, that a termination of this Freight Easement pursuant to
such an order shall apply only to those sections of the Right-OfWay subject to such I.C.C. order.

The termination provisions of

this Section 2 shall not apply to a termination of rail freight
service by UP done as part of a transfer of its common carrier
freight rights and obligations to a successor or assign.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this
Retained Freight Operating Easement to be executed as a sealed
instrument by their duly authorized representatives as of the
31st day of March, 1993.
Attests

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
Ev

/?. £. ji'CAd&fZ
(Print Name)

(Print Name)

Assistant Secretary

Title

Acknowledged:
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY:

BQ^W^>^^

By.

<£^c£S^c_

John C.^^ingre*
General Hanage2

Joan Etamside
President
STATE OF NEBRASKA
} SS:
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

)

On the 3 0 day of March, 1993, personally appeared before
Q<- c<s~ £A-Vc<,^£
and
*£. /*> ?c*4Z2<z r<l
t
me
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he,
the said
<Z. ^
S/*-V<~o ^S
is the Assistant
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad ComDany, and that he, the
said
^ . 4. J C ^ ^ 7 " 2
is the £-& A~?r: 7-0 St/stl
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said
3/29/93 Easemnt3.ret
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. / . / Sc/u«<:r-2.

C c U>- £f/<^<tf and

each
duly acknowl edged to me that said corporation executed the same
and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.
^ck^QcJC^
^/^-^-~^
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

A eaew CTA3Y-toi K i
HUfHA HOWAflO
OwKL.Eso.ffat.5.1398

STATE Or" UTAH
COUNTS

or-

)
SALT LAKE )

SS:

^ of £&&£*_
-__
./ 1993/ personally appeared
On the /** day
before me Joan Burnside 4nd John C. Pingree who being by me duly
sworn did say, each for herself /himself, that she, the said Joan
Burnside is the President, and he, the said John C. Pingree is
the General Manager of the Utah Transit Authority, and that the
within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of Utah
Transit Authority by authority of a resolution of its Board of
Directors and said Joan Burnside and John C. Pingree each duly
acknowledged to me that Utah Transit Authority executed the same
and that the seal affixed is the
2 seag/of
seal/of Utah Transit Authority.
Authorx
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commissi*-n Expiree.

yru^JL/'jr.

/9?5-

3/2S/9 3 Sasemnt3.ret

^ Late City.Ush84lG1 J
Uy Commas» E s i m I

—

D —

0015

EXHIBIT "A"

slt
w 5
o?
ttedM^Sred
£ 0 0 ) *?£<*'
» » ^ «« a>e Southwest
er o r t J l e
~ . _T
northeast quarter, and the Northwest <m*rt*r> n-f -MM *„„+»,„ ^
f Sect1fln
- N S S T ^ ?
^ ^
(13). Township Two(1) SortT L n c e ^ L m
^
J^West, salt Lake Meridian, and more fully d'escrtbed a s ^ h o ^ s ? t o ^ f t : }

S T h l ^ n 1 n g / ? t , a p o 1 n t o n t h e £ " * a n d W e s t center line of said Section
N, Thirteen (13), seven hundred forty-nine and one tenth (749 1? £ ? £ « *
rrfJS-

-

af

sa1d sect1on

^

fro" where i t 1s intersected by the center Tine

main track ftS^i
(IVJ^lSJl
iSll* P a r a n e I "*tft said center line of
1 f1ft
50 f e s t
himw—J^L?"*
? ' *
distant therefrom at right ancles, six
d m
^ ^ ^ 1t i ^ 8^8 T ^ ^ , J 6 1 5 ^ f e f i t « t t o f a S fighty-one
hSSSi.J^/nr ?^?*
(81*50 )East, one hundred one and fifteen
C
t 6nCa S0Uti7
dagrefis and
(S^SteS
- ? ^ *%21 5
ttrtrty -motes
0
a n d/ °
f e - t ° t w U J ^ ^ E S ? si**?*
seventy-three hundredths (862.73)
£eex, thence North eighty-nine degrees and thirty minutes (89*30M Vest inp
hundred (100) feet afto a point fifty (50) feet E a s t ^ f ? c i a f o r e s a ? f center
dl<L f B*™*™1*
the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no
degreesand thirty minufes (0-30*) East two hundred thirty-three and
sixty-eight hundredths (233.68) fest to the place of beginning.

A strip of land 100 feet wide, in the }
'• t
R.1W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lyi
present right of way of the Oregon Shor
fe/nt"'
trip
being more particularly described as fa
«*»"
Beginning at a point 18S4 feety more or
r
l e s s . South of the Northeast comer of
, 7 „ .^
„
a an
the East right of way line of the Orego
p/fflu?'
ora
the center line of Its main line, and a
^
_. ^
American Smelting and Refining Company's property; thence South 0*30* W.,
parallel to said center line, 1691.8 feat; thenca North 81° E.
along the
C
South side of John Berger's land, 101.4 feet; thenca North 0 30E., parallel
to and 150 feet from said center line of Oregon Short Line main line, 1637.
feet; thence South 83°3(M. 100.8 feet to the place of becrinning.
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7.
I^

™i>?£!ng/?3*a

p o 1 n t o n tte

&«* *"<* "est center line of «*w c . ^ -

» * thirty j r f n u t e W l S
™ ^7 W«f
J* 11 , 1 ? 8 ? 5 t h e n c a N a r t h n a Agrees
e
main tracfc and f l f t v (SD\ f S f ^ S , ! l 2 W l l e l with said center line of
hundred m t ^ l n ^ t w e ^
^
angles , ^
degress and f i f t y minutes f f l - i w c l ^ i f 2 u} ? * ? • thence North eighty-one

A i t n p o f land 100 feet wide, 1n the Northeast 1/4 of Section 13 T 2*
^ r S e ^ n h ^ B a S e ? l « e r 1 d 1 a n , lying East of and T ad|2ent
£tLf~"
e
S n
ffl
S S S J B O S ^ ^ T
f
?
°
^
S
2rt"n6
Railroad
Company.
Said
strip
H
aeing more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1854 feet, more or l e s s , West and 311 feet, more or
t h e S E a ^ U M n £ ^ »»rthe«t corner of said Section L , 3 d .d pcin? b i t w on
the c l S e r ? ? ! 0 ^ ^ M n e ° f , t h e O r ! g 0 n a o r t U n e Ra^™ad 50 feet f™
SerlS?Ll?S e °T ^ V ^ " " ? ' *"* ? tte Southwest comer of the
parallel S ^ S S M S R e T J a 1 , l 9 , S ? p ! 1 ? S P ^ e r t y ; thence South <T30' W.,
South c L ? J t d u C 8 2 t a r T 1 n e ' l f i 9 1 - a f e s t ; t h e n c s N o r t h 8 1 ° £ - along the
S and
S L ^ S " Berger's land 101.4 feet; thence Norch 0«30E., parallel
71 Jnc* J 5 0 f e e t from said canter Hne of Oreoon Short Line main H n ! TffS7
f e e t ; thence South 83«30W. 100.8 feet to the^lace 3 begn'nnfng.
'
^
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(Exhibit "A1"' c o n t i n u e d )

L

s

•J

vJ

^ > £?? oT fh e following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part
aT* ^ * £
the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6"), in
*> 2 OTP^T) Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian.
iX"?^C?
rr? ^j« ?"
V k«» **
6v4$iv

Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Northwest corner of said
1°t three; thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and
s i x t y (160) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundre
and sixty (160) rods to the place of beginning.

<*'c

Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of property, which are included wit
Che R e t a i n e d Freight Operacing Easement:

^ ^
1.
That p o r t i o n within t h e bounds of t h e e x i s t i n g s i n g l e
^ - ^ l i n e t h r o u g h t r a c k which i s auuxayi-myrply 66 f e e t i n w i d t h . "
P^^X
2.
That p o r t i o n of t h e land l y i n g between t h e s i n g l e l i n e
,g-£hrough t r a c k and 14 f e e t East and a b u t t i n g t h e c e n t e r l i n e of
V ^"^e H a s t e r l y most trade cf t h e e x i s t i n g s i d i n g trac3c s i t u a t e d i n
Vi ^ L c t s 4 0 , AS, and 62, Sandy S t a t i o n P l a t .
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